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Abstract 
This paper theoretically examines whether an individual transferable quotas (ITQs) regime 
can achieve the long-run efficiency through the reduction of vessel numbers. Assuming the 
existence of two types of vessels in terms of their scales, we consider not only quota 
transactions but also the exit of fishers. Changes in vessel sizes of incumbent fishers are also 
taken into consideration. We find that when large-scale vessels are more efficient than 
small-scale vessels, the long-run efficiency is achieved only with an ITQ regime. However, 
when small-scale vessels are more efficient than large-scale vessels, the long-run efficiency 
is not achieved; the number of vessels becomes too few compared to when the total 
harvesting cost is minimized.  
 
Key Words: Efficient fishery, fishery management, individual transferable quotas, quota 
transaction, vessel scale. 
JEL Classification: Q22, Q28.
                                                  
✝ Corresponding Address: 1-155, Ichiban-cho, Uegahara, Nishinomiya, Hyogo, 662-8501, JAPAN. 
Phone & Fax: +81-798-54-4653. E-mail: keisaku@kwansei.ac.jp 
‡ Authors are grateful to Tetsuya Nakajima, Akira Maeda, Hideki Nakamura, Masayuki Komatsu, 
Hisashi Kurokura, Nobuyuki Yagi, and Toshio Katsukawa for helpful comments. We also gratefully 
acknowledge the financial supports from Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, and the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B). 
† Address: 27 Seirei-cho, Seto, Aichi 489-0863, JAPAN. Phone & Fax: +81- 561-89-2010 (Ext. 3541). 
E-mail: ytakara@ps.nanzan-u.ac.jp 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
Having faced the depletion of fish stocks all over the world, governments have adopted 
many types of resource management measures over the past several decades, including 
technical measures and input and output controls. Among those measures, the individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) regime is considered to be the most effective. Under this regime, 
a government sets the total allowable catch (TAC) and determines the initial allocation of 
quotas to fishers. Then, it establishes the market for quota transactions. Similar to regimes of 
tradable allowances in other fields of environmental and resource issues, such as tradable 
emission permits, a TAC-ITQ regime (referred hereafter as the ITQ regime) is able to 
achieve two goals at the same time: it can control the total amount of catch and, accordingly, 
the resource stock while achieving economic efficiency. Less efficient fishers sell their quota 
holdings to more efficient fishers instead of using the quotas for themselves. Thus, excess 
competition and over capacity are avoided, and the total cost of catching a certain amount of 
fish is minimized.1  
   Strictly speaking, there are two types of efficiency: the short-run and the long-run 
efficiency. With the former, the total cost is minimized in each period (fishing season) given 
the fixed number and the sizes of vessels. For the latter, the total cost is minimized by 
adjusting the number and the sizes of vessels, assuming that the short-run efficiency is 
achieved. Theoretically, if the quota market is competitive and if free entry/exit is assured, 
both the short-run and long-run efficiencies can be achieved under an ITQ regime.2 
In reality, however, the two premises may not be satisfied in many cases. When the 
participants of regimes are few or when there are dominant players, these may have the 
                                                  
1 There are more effects in terms of efficiency. For example, fishers can determine when they catch 
fish to maximize their own profits, because they do not need to be catching fish at a stretch. Thus, 
when fish prices are low (resp. high), fishers have weak (resp. strong) incentives to catch fish. As a 
result, fish prices become stable. For the basic analysis of ITQ regimes, see Clark (2006) for 
example.  
2 For example, see Spulber (1985) for the theoretical analysis of tradable effluent permits. 
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market power when selling and buying quotas. In this case, the short-run efficiency is not 
achieved.3  
On the other hand, it is usually costly to enter the fishery because new entrants have to 
pay a large amount of fixed costs, including the cost for acquiring the techniques specific to 
fishing activities. 4  Sometimes fishery cooperatives restrict new entrants, and it is 
time-consuming for entrants to settle into fishers’ communities even without clear 
substantive restrictions. Moreover, the authorities may also consider the restriction of new 
entrants because there are usually too many vessels compared to the number needed for 
efficiency before the introduction of an ITQ regime.5 Alternatively, the authorities may face 
political pressure from established fishers for entry restriction. In these cases, the long-run 
efficiency may be either not achieved or delayed.6  
   This paper focuses on the long-run efficiency in the presence of entry barriers and 
examines when the efficiency is (and is not) achieved with only an ITQ regime through 
reduction of vessels. In particular, our analysis focuses on the following three types of real 
situations. 
   First, we consider the situation in which there are too many vessels/fishers before the 
introduction of an ITQ regime in terms of efficiency. According to the literature evaluating 
the ITQ regimes that have been adopted in New Zealand, Iceland, and other countries, 
excess entry was verified in all of the fisheries in those countries.7 
                                                  
3  See Anderson (1991) and Armstrong (2008) for the theoretical analysis under imperfect 
competition. 
4 Rosendahl and Storrøsten (2010) assumed that new entrants have to pay an additional fixed cost in 
their theoretical analysis. 
5 Newell et al. (2005) referred to measures that may accompany ITQ regimes. According to the FAO 
(2006, 2008), there are usually license schemes in many countries, regardless of whether or not ITQ 
regimes have already been introduced. For example, there are strict regulations on new entry in many 
coastal and offshore fishing areas in Japan both formally and informally. Although Japan has not yet 
introduced any ITQ regimes, it has already introduced TAC regimes, and it is now considering the 
introduction of ITQs. However, it cannot be assumed that all of those entry regulations will be 
removed when the ITQs are implemented. 
6 See Weninger and Just (2002) and Vestergaard et al. (2005) for example. 
7 For the evaluation of ITQ regimes, see Clark et al. (1988), Arnason (1993), Gauvin et al. (1994), 
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   Second, assuming the existence of a heterogeneous cost structure for vessels, we 
considered two cases: one in which large-scale vessels are more efficient than small-scale 
ones and one in which small-scale vessels are more efficient than large-scale ones. When 
there are a lot of traditional small-scale fishers before the introduction of an ITQ regime and 
there are no effective measures of resource management, fishers do not have incentives to 
introduce large-scale vessels with a large amount of fixed cost because the amount of catch 
will be much less than the minimum efficiency level. Thus, it is likely that the former case 
holds.  
However, when only TAC is introduced, it is generally thought that an excess of 
investment occurs and that the scales of vessels become too large in terms of efficiency. This 
is because fishers have to compete for fish with better technology, larger vessels, and higher 
speed. In such a case, it is likely that the latter case holds. Lian et al. (2010) and Weninger 
(2008) empirically concluded that medium-size vessels are more efficient than small- and 
large-sized vessels in the case of the Pacific Coast groundfish fishery and the Gulf of Mexico 
Grouper Fishery.8 Our analysis can be certainly applied to cases in which there are more 
than two types of vessels. 
   Third, we consider both the vessel and quota transactions. Under ideal ITQ regimes, a 
fisher is able to sell all of quota holdings to another fisher and exit from the fishery, which 
we call “vessel transaction” in our analysis. Fishers also adjust their quota holdings by 
selling/buying relatively small amount of quotas in the quota market. Thus, these two types 
of transactions should be taken into consideration to investigate the long-run efficiency of 
ITQ regimes. Moreover, in reality, after an ITQ regime is introduced, the vessel scales 
owned by existing fishers change over time. Therefore, we also took into consideration the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Weninger (1998), and Dupont and Grafton (2001) among others. Moreover, Matthiasson (1996) 
theoretically analyzed the situation in which the vessel number becomes too large by introducing the 
cost of implementing measures. 
8 Brandt (2007) also conducted empirical studies and obtained the mean efficiency according to 
vessel sizes. 
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changes in vessel scales that are chosen by the fishers. Weninger and Just (2002) and 
Vestergaard et al. (2005) considered the non-malleability of capital, and they theoretically 
demonstrated the delay of exit. Rosendahl and Storrøsten (2010) examined the effects of 
allocation schemes on entry/exit. However, they did not deal with the two types of vessel 
transactions and scale changes explicitly.  
   In contrast to the literature analyzing the tradable emission permits, we simplify the 
following two factors in the analysis. First, fishing quotas are allowances for the output. To 
focus on the quota transactions and the fluctuation of quota prices, we consider the TAC as 
constant. Accordingly, because the output is regulated by the TAC, we consider the 
fish/output price as constant.9 Second, we exclude the “banking” of quotas because it is 
usually not permitted in terms of resource management. 
We find that when large-scale vessels are more efficient than small-scale vessels, the 
long-run efficiency is achieved only with an ITQ regime. However, when small-scale vessels 
are more efficient than large-scale vessels, the long-run efficiency is not achieved; the 
number of vessels becomes too few compared to when the total cost is minimized.  
   The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the basic model and 
the social optimum, respectively. Section 4 investigates the long-run efficiency after 
describing the quota transactions. Section 5 refers to the extension, and Section 6 provides 
the concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
Consider a fishery in which there are Ln  fishers who have been engaging in fishing with 
large-scale vessels and Sn  fishers who have been engaging in fishing with small-scale 
                                                  
9 We do not delve into uncertainty, because our focus is on vessel scales/exit and the long-run 
efficiency. Uncertainty, however, can affect the efficiency of fishing under ITQ regimes. See 
Bergland and Pederson (2006), for example. Moreover, in reality, the TAC may vary according to the 
resource stock changes.  
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vessels in the initial period. Each fisher uses one vessel and harvests fish stock of single 
species. All large-scale vessels are identical, and all small-scale vessels are also identical. 
Moreover, in terms of fishing technique, all fishers are identical, which implies that their cost 
conditions are equal to each other if they have the same type of vessels. We exclude the 
possibility of new entry because of entry costs or/and regulations. 
The cost structure of each type of vessel is: 
     iiiii FqcqC  ,      ,0,0  ii cc                                   (1) 
where iq , ic , and iF  denote the amount of catch, the variable cost, and the fixed cost of a 
fisher of type  SLii , , respectively.10 It is assumed that SL FF  , and SL cc   for any 
given amount of catch. Moreover, because we assume the existence of fixed costs and 
increasing marginal costs, there exists a unique amount of catch that minimizes the average 
cost ( AC ) for each type,  SLiqi ,ˆ  , and SL qq ˆˆ   holds.  
   We define the two cases as follows. 
 
Definition 1: When    SSLL qACqAC ˆˆ   holds, it is Case A, whereas 
when    SSLL qACqAC ˆˆ   holds, it is Case B.  
 
Both cases are depicted in Figures 1 (a) and (b). In what follows, let subscripts A and B 
denote Case A and Case B, respectively, when we need to discriminate between the two 
cases. Theoretically, Case A is likely to arise when the fixed cost of a large-scale vessel is not 
very large, and the marginal cost of a small-scale vessel is relatively high. However, Case B 
is likely to arise when the fixed cost of a large-scale vessel is relatively large, and the 
marginal cost of a small-scale vessel is not very high. 
                                                  
10 In the literature of the analyses of fishery economics, fish biomass stock is included in the cost 
function. Moreover, the stock is combined with the variable that represents the fishing effort, when 
the effort is explicitly described. In this paper, those variables do not materially affect the main 
results. Therefore, we drop those variables. See, for example, Clark (2006), and Danielsson (2000) 
for cost structures. 
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As noted in the introduction, when there are no effective measures for fishery 
management or when there are only vessel-quotas, either case can exist before an ITQ 
regime is introduced.11 For example, consider the situation in which there are many 
traditional small-scale fishers, vessels quotas are allocated, and there is no quotas transaction 
scheme. In this case, it is likely that a large-scale vessel cannot get a large amount of quotas 
and, accordingly, it cannot catch a large amount of fish to make profits, as a fisher usually 
has to pay a large fixed cost to operate a large-scale vessel. Thus, without an ITQ regime, 
small-scale fishers do not have incentives to shift their vessels to large-scale ones, and a 
situation like Case A can exist. However, if there are no effective measures for resource 
management, there is excessive competition between fishers. In such a case, an excess of 
investments can easily occur on vessel sizes, fishing gears, and so on. Thus, a situation like 
Case B can exist. Even when TAC is implemented without any quota transaction scheme, the 
situation like Case B can arise.  
The government introduces an ITQ regime for the fishery: it sets the TAC, which is 
denoted by Q , determines the initial allocation to each fisher, and establishes the quota 
market. In the present context, the “ITQ” includes both vessel transactions and quota 
transactions explained below. The amount of Q  is fixed in this model. The initial 
allocation is also exogenous for fishers, although the quota holdings of fishers can change 
through vessel transactions.12  
Then, the total harvesting cost for the society (TC ) is: 
                                                  
11 Moreover, it is also possible that three types of vessels exist in reality: the middle-scale vessel is 
the most efficient, and the small-scale and large-scale vessels are less efficient than the middle-scale 
one. Our analysis can be applied to this situation. 
12 Our results are not influenced by the initial allocation, although the initial allocation can determine 
whether a situation like Case A or Case B holds. In reality, it is natural to consider that SL qq  , 
because the initial allocation is usually determined according to the past fishing activities (the past 
catching amounts). Theoretically, however, the results do not change whether or not this assumption 
is made. 
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       

 SL
n
k
SksS
n
j
LjLL FqcFqcTC
1
,
1
, ,                                   (2) 
where Qqq kSjL   ,, .  
The demand curve for fish is downward sloping: 
   QPp  ,   0P , 
where p  denotes the fish (output) price. Because the TAC level is fixed, the price of fish 
does not change. It should be noted that this fish price is different from the quota price. As 
explained in Section 4, the quota price changes because vessel numbers change and because 
quotas are traded in the quota market. 
We consider the following processes in determining the harvesting structure. In each 
period, in the first stage, a pair of fishers is “randomly” chosen.13 Each fisher of the pair is 
given a chance to make a deal of purchasing all of the quotas owned by the other fisher, 
selling all of her/his own quotas to the other fisher, or shifting her/his vessel to the other type. 
Hereafter, we call each of the first two cases “vessel transaction” and the last case “vessel 
shift”. In the case of vessel transactions, both fishers have to agree on the terms of the 
contract, and the seller exits from the fishery. Each fisher is also allowed to do nothing. 
Observing the situations in the real world, we set up the following assumptions on these 
vessel transactions/shifts for the clarity of the theoretical analysis.  
 
Assumption 1: When more than two fishers assemble and negotiate for a contract from 
which every participant gains, it is very costly and time consuming. Therefore, a contract of 
a vessel transaction is always made between two fishers. 
 
                                                  
13 The number of pairs chosen in each period does not matter. The possibility that the efficient 
harvesting structure is achieved is the strongest under the setting of “one pair in each period”. Our 
purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that inefficient situations can be generated with an ITQ 
regime. Thus, with more than one pair in each period, our results become more robust. This point is 
referred to in Subsection 4.3. 
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Assumption 2: Fishers do not have an incentive to do a vessel transaction/shift unless their 
profit increases by the transaction/shift. In other words, if their profit increases by the 
transaction/shift, they always make a contract of a vessel transaction or shift their vessel 
scales. 
 
Thus, the fishers of a pair, who are randomly chosen, do not search for other fishers to 
establish contracts.14 Moreover, if the profits before and after a vessel transaction/shift are 
equal to each other, a fisher does not have an incentive to perform a vessel 
transaction/shift.15 
   We assume that there are too many fishers in terms of the long-run efficiency in the 
initial period, and we exclude new entry of fishers. As noted in the introduction, there are 
many examples of entry restrictions in the real world, and it is also very costly for new 
entrants to pay a large amount of fixed cost, including the cost for acquiring the techniques 
specific to fishing activities. In general, the authorities aim to decrease the vessel numbers to 
improve the efficiency of fishing activities. Given these factors, we focus on the possibility 
of achieving efficiency through the reduction of vessel numbers. 
Once the two fishers decide on what to do about vessel transactions/shifts, the second 
stage begins. Each fisher who keeps engaging in fishing activities pays a fixed cost for 
her/his own vessel.16 Then, the quotas are transacted between fishers. Hereafter, we call this 
type of transaction as “quota transactions”. In this stage, each fisher does not sell all the 
                                                  
14 Because two fishers are chosen randomly, Assumption 1 does not harm the generality of our 
analysis. Although we assume that a contract of a vessel transaction is always made between two 
fishers for clarity, the important point is that it is very costly and impossible for all fishers in the 
fishery to gather at the same time and find the optimal solution.  
15 Assumption 2 can be justified if we consider the existence of a small switching/exit cost. 
16 This is a kind of rental price of capital. The fixed cost of a large-scale vessel for a fisher who has 
been a small-scale fisher for a long time may be larger than that for a fisher who has already been a 
large-scale fisher, because there may be switching costs and any previous experience may lower the 
fixed cost. For simplicity, however, they are assumed to be the same. The existence of the switching 
costs does not materially change the results. We will refer to this point in Section 5. 
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quotas s/he holds, which implies that no fisher exits. Quotas are transacted in a perfectly 
competitive market.  
Because we do not need to explicitly describe the period, we omit the notation for the 
periods in the following analysis. Moreover, for theoretical consistency, we made the 
following assumption. 
 
Assumption 3: Fishers are “complete” price takers. 
 
Assumption 4: Fishers decide on vessel transactions/shifts according to instantaneous 
benefits, which are the benefits gained in the period in which the transactions/shifts take 
place given the quota price. 
 
Assumption 3 means that each fisher takes the quota price as given not only when s/he 
conducts the quota transactions but also when s/he chooses a vessel transaction/shift. In other 
words, fishers expect that the quota price in the previous period also holds in the present 
period when they determine vessel transaction/shifts.17 Assumption 4 means that fishers do 
not consider changes in the benefits in the future. Vessel transactions/shifts are sometimes 
time consuming and, accordingly, it takes a long time for the harvesting structure to be 
adjusted. 18  Therefore, fishers are assumed not to take into consideration all of 
transactions/shifts which will be done by other fishers in the future when they determine 
                                                  
17 Weninger and Just (2002), Vestergaard et al. (2005) and Rosendahl and Storrøsten (2010) 
examined the entry/exit problem under ITQ regimes. Weninger and Just (2002) and Vestergaard et al. 
(2005) considered the quota price as exogenous and constant. Although Rosendahl and Storrøsten 
(2010) allowed the change in the quota price over the periods, they did not relate the quota price to 
the number of fishers. In reality, however, one vessel transaction/shift may be accompanied by a 
transaction of a large amount of quotas at one time, or that the total demand for quotas could change 
drastically. Therefore, fishers may predict the effect of a vessel transaction/shift on the quota price. 
The basic results do not materially change even if we take into consideration the expectation of 
fishers on the price effects. We will refer to this point in Section 5. 
18 See Weninger and Just (2002) and Vestergaard et al. (2005) for the theoretical analyses. 
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their own vessel transactions/shifts. Moreover, this assumption is consistent with the 
assumption of “complete price takers”.  
 
3. The Social Optimum 
First, we examine the social optimum to catch a certain amount of fish, which is regulated by 
TAC. Because the fish price is constant, the objective is to minimize the total harvesting cost, 
(2). The total cost minimization problem, given both types of vessel numbers can be written 
as: 
         

 SL
kSjL
n
k
SkSS
n
j
LjLLqq
FqcFqcMin
1
,
1
,, ,,
, 
     Qqqts kSjL   ,,.. , 
where j  and k  are indices of fishers. Then, the following first-order conditions (FOCs) 
are obtained: 
  lSkSlSjL cccc .,,, ,   )( lk  .                                         (3) 
Thus, the equilibrium outputs are written as   ),(,,* SLiQnnq LSi  , and the total harvesting 
cost can be rewritten as follows: 
       SSSSLLLL FqcnFqcnTC  ** .                                    (2)’ 
Thus, the total cost is minimized when both types of vessel numbers are chosen such that 
(2)’ is minimized. 
Let us focus on Case A. First, suppose that ALqQ ,ˆ  is an integer. Then, it is clear that 
the average cost is minimized when the number of large-scale (resp. small-scale) vessels is 
ALqQ ,ˆ  (resp. zero), and each large-scale vessel catches ALq ,ˆ . In this case, considering that 
the TAC and the fish price are fixed, the total cost (resp. the social surplus) is also minimized 
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(maximized).19 
   Second, suppose that ALqQ ,ˆ  is not an integer, and let us define ALn ,ˆ  as an integer 
such that 1ˆˆˆ ,,,  ALALAL nqQn . Consider the case in which the number of small-scale 
fishers is zero. Then, the number of large-scale fishers that minimizes the total harvesting 
cost is either ALn ,ˆ  or 1ˆ , ALn . In either case, the average cost is higher than  ALAL qAC ,, ˆ . 
In the case of ALn ,ˆ  (resp. 1ˆ , ALn ), each large-scale vessel catches the amount greater (resp. 
smaller) than ALq ,ˆ . If the average cost is higher than  ASAS qAC ,, ˆ , it may be that the total 
harvesting cost when ALn ,ˆ  large-scale vessels and some small-scale vessels are operating is 
lower than when only large-scale vessels are operating. For example, when the number of 
large-scale vessels is ALn ,ˆ , it is likely that the operation of an additional small-scale vessel 
decreases the average cost of each large-scale vessel as the amount of catch gets closer to 
ALq ,ˆ .  
Case B can be analyzed analogously. For clarity of the following analyses, we made the 
following assumption. 
 
Assumption 5: In Case A (resp. Case B), ALqQ ,ˆ (resp. BSqQ ,ˆ  ) is an integer. 
 
Then, the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 1: At the social optimum, in Case A (resp. Case B), the harvesting structure is 
such that (a) only large-scale (resp. small-scale) vessels are operating, (b) the number of 
                                                  
19 It should be noted repeatedly that the fish price is different from the quota price. If we neglect the 
integer problem, the fact that the total cost is minimized can be easily verified. See Appendix A. 
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operating vessels is ALqQ ,ˆ  (resp. BSqQ ,ˆ ), and (c) each fisher which engages in fishing 
catches ALq ,ˆ  (resp. BSq ,ˆ ). 
 
In the following analysis, we assume that there are more than ALqQ ,ˆ  (resp. BSqQ ,ˆ ) 
fishers in Case A (resp. Case B) before the introduction of a TAC-ITQ regime, which means 
that there are too many fishers in terms of efficiency. 
 
4. Transactions of Quotas/Vessels and Long-run Efficiency 
In this section, we describe quota transactions and vessel transactions/shifts. Then, we 
investigate whether an ITQ regime is able to achieve the long run efficiency (the social 
optimum). To begin with, we describe the equilibrium in the quota market.  
 
4.1 Quota Transactions in the Quota Market 
In the second stage in each period, each type of fisher determines the amount of quota that 
s/he buys (or sells) so that her/his profit is maximized given the numbers of both types of 
fishers. The profit functions are given by: 
       ,,,,,, jLjLjLLjLjL qqrqCqQp                                 (4) 
       ,,,,,, kSkSkSSkSkS qqrqCqQp                              (5) 
where r  and iq
  denote the price of quota and the quota holdings in the beginning of the 
quota transaction stage in each period, respectively.20 In the following, we omit the indices 
of fishers, j  and k , unless they are needed. The FOCs are: 
      0,0  rcQprcQp SL .                                     (6) 
                                                  
20 This quota holding is different from the initial allocation, because the amount of quota holdings of 
a fisher changes after a vessel transaction is made in the first stage of past periods. This difference, 
however, does not matter for the present analysis. 
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Each large-scale (resp. small-scale) fisher harvests  Qnnq SLTL ,,  (resp.  Qnnq SLTS ,, ) 
such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
     ,TSSTLL qcqc                                                         (7) 
  .Qqnqn TSS
T
LL                                                     (8) 
It should be noted that because all fishers are price takers, the amounts of catches are not 
influenced by initial quota holdings ( kSjL qq ,, ,
 ) given the numbers of both types of fishers. 
From (6), the equilibrium quota price is obtained:  Qnnr SL ,, .  
Each fisher expects that the quota price does not change by a change in both types of 
vessel numbers when s/he chooses a vessel transaction/shift. According to (8), however, a 
change in the number of vessels actually affects the amounts of the catches and the price of 
the quotas.  
A vessel transaction defined in Section 2 means that the number of either type of vessel 
decreases. In such a case, the total demand for quotas decreases given the quota price. This 
change in demand leads to a decrease in the quota price, because the supply of quotas is 
fixed by TAC. Because 0ic , from (6), a decrease in the number of either type of vessel 
increases the amount of catch of each incumbent vessel.21  
Similarly, because it is assumed that SL cc   for any given amount of catch, a vessel 
shift from a small-scale (resp. a large-scale) to a large-scale (resp. a small-scale) increases 
(resp. decreases) the total demand for quotas given the quota price. This change in demand 
leads to an increase (resp. a decrease) in the quota price. 
 
4.2 Vessel Transactions/Shifts and Equilibria 
In this subsection, we examine the equilibria, when both vessel transactions and shifts could 
                                                  
21 To capture this point intuitively, we provide the continuous case in Appendix B. 
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take place. There is, however, no new entry. First, we set up the definition of equilibria on 
the harvesting structure. 
 
Definition 2: At equilibrium, (a) a fisher does not have an incentive to shift her/his vessel 
size when s/he is randomly chosen, and (b) a contract of vessel transaction cannot be made 
between any randomly chosen two fishers.  
 
Let us begin with Case A. First, suppose that  ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ . In this case, for both 
small-scale and large-scale fishers,     ),(,,,, SLiqACqMC TAiAiTAiAi   and AiTAi qq ,, ˆ  hold. 
Moreover, from (6),   rqMCp TAiAi  ,,  holds. Because the profit from catching a unit of 
fish is  TAiAi qACp ,, , AiAi qr ,,   holds whether a fisher is a seller or a buyer of quotas in 
the quota market (in the second stage). Figures 2 (a) indicates the case in which a fisher is a 
seller. The shaded area is the profit of the fisher. On the other hand, Figure 2 (b) indicates the 
case in which a fisher is a buyer. The shaded area minus the dotted area is the profit of the 
fisher. 
However, each fisher of a pair, who is randomly chosen, has an incentive to offer a price 
that is greater than the profit of the other fisher in the first stage. This is because s/he is a 
price taker, and s/he expects that her/his profit will increase by Amqr ,
 , where the subscript 
m  denotes the other fisher of the pair. Although one of the two fishers, who are randomly 
chosen, may have an incentive to shift her/his vessel type, the quota holdings ( Aiq ,
 ) do not 
change because of vessel shifts. Therefore, the profit of the fisher is less than Aiqr ,
  even 
after s/he did a vessel shift. The price offered by the other fisher of a pair must be more 
attractive for the fisher than the profit s/he can gain after shifting her/his own vessel type. 
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Thus, a vessel transaction takes place. Moreover, because the number of fishers decreases, 
the quota price decreases. 
 
Lemma 1: In Case A, there is no equilibrium in which the quota price is greater 
than  ALAL qACp ,, ˆ . 
  
Secondly, suppose that    ALALASAS qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ  . In this case, 
   T ASAST ASAS qACqMC ,,,,   and    T ALALT ALAL qACqMC ,,,,   holds. Thus, whether fishers 
are sellers or buyers of quotas in the quota market (the second stage), ASAS qr ,,
  and 
ALAL qr ,,
  hold. The shaded area of Figure 3 indicates the profit of a large-scale fisher 
who is a buyer of quotas in the quota market. If a small-scale fisher shifts her/his vessel to a 
large-scale one, s/he expects that her/his profit will be equal to or greater than ASqr ,
 . 
Therefore, a small-scale fisher has an incentive to shift her/his vessel to a large-scale one. 
Nevertheless, no other fisher has an incentive to offer the price that is equal to or greater than 
),(, SLiqr Ai  . Thus, when    ALALASAS qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ  , vessel shifts from 
small-scale vessels to large-scale ones take place, and the quota price increases.  
   Thirdly, suppose that  ASAS qACpr ,, ˆ . Similar to the previous case, no vessel 
transactions take place. However, from the assumption of Case A, it holds that 
           rpqMCqACqACqAC T ASAST ASASASASALAL  ,,,,,,,, ˆˆ . 
Thus, whether ASq ,
  is larger or smaller than ALq ,ˆ , a small-scale fisher expects that her/his 
profit will increase if s/he shifts her/his vessel to a large-scale one and catches the amount of 
ALq ,ˆ . Moreover, the profit will increase further if s/he chooses the amount of catch so that 
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the marginal cost of catch is equal to the gap between the fish and quota prices. Thus, a 
small-scale fisher has an incentive to shift her/his vessel to a large-scale one, and the quota 
price increases by the vessel shift. 
  
Lemma 2: In Case A, there is no equilibrium in which (a)  ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ  holds, and 
(b) there is one or more than one small-scale fisher. 
 
Because there are too many fishers in terms of efficiency before an ITQ regime is 
introduced,  ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ  holds in the initial period. From the assumptions on the 
cost structure, there must be equal to or more than ALqQ ,ˆ fishers in total when 
 ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ  holds. Moreover, vessel transactions/shifts take place sequentially such 
that one vessel transaction or shift takes place in each period. From Lemma 1, when 
 ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ , a vessel transaction takes place, which implies that the total number of 
vessel decreases. Moreover, from Lemma 2, when  ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ , a small-scale fisher 
shifts her/his vessel to a large-scale one, which also implies that the quota price increases. 
Consequently, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: In Case A, the social optimum is achieved at equilibrium under an ITQ 
regime. 
 
Now let us turn to Case B. First, suppose that  BSBS qACpr ,, ˆ . In this case, as in 
Case A, BiBi qr ,,
  holds whether a fisher is a seller or a buyer of quotas in the quota 
market (in the second stage). Each fisher of a pair, who is randomly chosen, has an incentive 
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to offer a price that is greater than the profit of the other fisher in the first stage, because s/he 
expects the quota price will not change by the vessel transaction. Although one of the two 
fishers, who are randomly chosen, may have an incentive to shift her/his vessel type, the 
quota holdings ( Aiq ,
 ) do not change by vessel shifts. Therefore, the profit of the fisher is less 
than Aiqr ,
  even after a vessel shift. The price offered by the other fisher must be more 
attractive to a fisher than the profit by shifting her/his own vessel type. Thus, a vessel 
transaction takes place, and the quota price decreases. 
 
Lemma 3: In Case B, there is no equilibrium in which the quota price is greater than 
 BSBS qACp ,, ˆ . 
 
Secondly, suppose that    BSBSBLBL qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ  . In this case, whether 
fishers are sellers or buyers of quotas in the quota market (in the second stage), BLBL qr ,,
  
and BSBS qr ,,
  hold. If a large-scale fisher shifts her/his vessel to a small-scale one, s/he 
expects that her/his profit will be equal to or greater than BLqr ,
 . Therefore, a large-scale 
fisher has an incentive to shift her/his vessel to a small-scale one. However, no other fisher 
has an incentive to offer the price which is equal to or greater than ),(, SLiqr Bi  . Thus, 
when    BSBSBLBL qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ  , vessel shifts from large-scale vessels to 
small-scale ones take place. In contrast to Case A, the quota price decreases further.  
Thirdly, suppose that  BLBL qACpr ,, ˆ . Similar to the previous case, no vessel 
transactions take place. However, from the assumption of Case B, it holds that 
           rpqMCqACqACqAC T BLBLT BLBLBLBLBSBS  ,,,,,,,, ˆˆ . 
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Thus, whether BLq ,
  is larger or smaller than BSq ,ˆ , a large-scale fisher expects that her/his 
profit will increase if s/he shifts her/his vessel to a small-scale one and catches the amount of 
BSq ,ˆ . Moreover, the profit increases further if s/he chooses the amount of catch so that the 
marginal cost of catch is equal to the gap between the fish and quota prices. Thus, a 
large-scale fisher has an incentive to shift her/his vessel to a small-scale one, and the quota 
price decreases by the vessel shift. 
 
Lemma 4: In Case B, there is no equilibrium in which (a)  BSBS qACpr ,, ˆ  holds, and 
(b) there is one or more than one large-scale fisher. 
 
Because there are too many fishers in terms of efficiency before an ITQ regime is 
introduced,  BSBS qACpr ,, ˆ  holds in the initial period. The number of total vessels 
decreases as vessel transactions take place. From Lemma 3, it is possible that a small-scale 
fisher exits from the fishery and that large-scale fishers are remaining when 
 BSBS qACpr ,, ˆ  holds. Therefore, there are generally less than SqQ ˆ fishers in total 
when  BSBS qACpr ,, ˆ  holds. This is because the amount of catch of a large-scale fisher 
is greater than that of a small-scale fisher given the quota price. Moreover, from Lemma 4, 
when  SS qACpr ˆ  holds, large-scale fishers shift their own vessels to small-scale ones. 
This implies that the price of the quota decreases further.  
 
Proposition 3: In Case B, in general, the social optimum is not achieved at equilibrium 
under an ITQ regime. In particular, the number of fishers is smaller than that under the 
social optimum, and the quota price is lower than that under the social optimum. 
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4.3 Discussion 
The result of Case B contrasts strikingly with that of Case A. Whether the size of inefficient 
fishers is too large (Case B) or too small (Case A) influences the functions of an ITQ regime. 
We may not achieve an efficient harvesting structure such that the total harvesting cost is 
minimized, due to the size of inefficient fishers. 
These results are also important in terms of policy implications. When the size of 
inefficient fishers is too large, the government has to implement other kinds of measures to 
achieve the efficiency of the fishery with an ITQ regime. For example, input controls, such 
as the restriction on vessel transactions and the encouragement of vessel shifts from larger 
ones to small ones, are possible candidates.  
   Our results become more robust with more than one pair in each period. The reason is as 
follows. Although each fisher is a price taker, the actual quota price is influenced by changes 
in the number and sizes of vessels. Also, it is clear from the results obtained above that the 
lower the quota price, the less incentives fishers have to make vessel transactions. “One pair 
in each period” implies that the turn for another pair comes after the price change due to a 
vessel transaction determined by the first pair. However, if two or more than two pairs are 
chosen in each period, more than one pair decides to make vessel transactions at the same 
time before the price change is observed. Therefore, it is possible that the number of vessels 
decreases rapidly and becomes fewer than that needed for the social optimum (long-run 
efficiency) even in Case A. 
 
5. Extension 
In this section, we consider some extensions, which we have excluded thus far to extract the 
essential results.  
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   First, we have assumed that each fisher owns only one vessel. In reality, however, 
large-scale fishers often own more than one vessel. In such a case, even if entry barriers exist, 
existing fishers can purchase additional vessels. Then, the social optimum may be achieved 
in Case B because existing fishers increase the small-scale vessels by which their profits 
increase. 
In this case, however, fishers must invest in new capital, which is usually costly. The 
fixed cost is considered to be greater when a fisher begins fishing with a new vessel than 
when a fisher keeps fishing with a used vessel even if s/he is an established fisher.22 
Moreover, the authorities sometimes set upper bounds of quotas owned by one fisher to 
avoid the concentration of quotas to a small number of fishers. Lian et al. (2010) referred to 
this point and investigated the harvest structure under different kinds of restrictions of quota 
holdings and transactions. Anderson and Bogetoft (2007) also considered the upper bound. 
In the presence of these types of costs and restrictions, the social optimum cannot be 
achieved in Case B. In this respect, it can be considered that there exists a conflict between 
the long-run and the short-run efficiency. 
   Second, there are usually switching costs, which are the costs for vessel shifts in the 
present context. The reason is the same as the case of new entry: a vessel shift may imply 
“scrapping one vessel” and “investing in a new vessel.” In this case, vessel shifts are 
discouraged, and vessel transactions are encouraged instead.  
   Consider the situation in which    ALALASAS qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ   (resp. 
   BSBSBLBL qACprqACp ,,,, ˆˆ  ) holds in Case A (resp. Case B). Then, a vessel 
transaction can be made between the two fishers of a pair if a small-scale (resp. a 
large-scale) fisher does not have an incentive to shift her/his vessel to a large-scale (resp. a 
small-scale) one because of the switching cost. Thus, it is likely that the situation in which 
                                                  
22 Weninger and Just (2002) considered the cost for investment in new capital. 
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the number of vessels is smaller than that under the social optimum is generated even in 
Case A. Consequently, the switching costs make the inefficiency greater in both cases.  
   Third, we have assumed that fishers are price takers even when they decide on vessel 
transactions/shifts. Fishers, however, may expect that the quota price will change because of 
vessel transactions/shifts. In the following, we extend the basic analysis to the case in which 
fishers take into consideration only the price effect of their own vessel transactions/shifts.23 
For simplicity, we assume that the initial allocations to all small-scale vessels are the same 
( Sq ) and those to all large-scale vessels are the same ( Lq ). Moreover, we consider the case 
in which SL qq  . 
   When a vessel transaction takes place, the number of total vessels decreases. Therefore, 
the quota price decreases as compared with the last period. In this case, sellers (resp. buyers) 
of quotas suffer (resp. enjoy) an additional loss (gain) from the price decrease. Therefore, in 
both Cases A and B, vessel transactions are encouraged as far as there are fishers who will be 
buyers of quotas in the quota market after their vessel transactions. On the other hand, it is 
possible that there exists a case in which every fisher will be a buyer of quotas in the quota 
market if s/he does a vessel transaction and remains in the fishery. In such a case, vessel 
transactions, which are needed to achieve the efficiency, are hampered even in Case A. 
   Moreover, the quota price increases (resp. decreases) by a vessel shift from a small-scale 
(resp. a large-scale) to a large-scale (resp. a small-scale). In Case A, vessel shifts from 
small-scales to large-scales are important for the social optimum to be achieved through an 
ITQ regime. The quota price, however, increases by this shift. Moreover, a fisher who 
changes her/his own vessel from a small-scale to a large-scale is likely to become a buyer of 
quotas in the quota market, because s/he is originally a small-scale fisher and owns a small 
amount of initial allocation. Therefore, as compared with the case in which fishers do not 
consider the quota price effect, this type of vessel shift is less likely to take place. In Case B, 
                                                  
23 See Footnote 17. 
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vessel shifts from large-scale to small-scale are important for the sizes of vessels to become 
efficient.24 The quota price, however, decreases by this shift. Moreover, a fisher who 
changes her/his own vessel from a large-scale to a small-scale is likely to become a seller of 
quotas in the quota market because s/he is originally a large-scale fisher and owns a large 
amount of initial allocation. Therefore, as compared with the case in which fishers do not 
take into consideration the quota price effect, this type of vessel shift is also less likely to 
take place. 
   Overall, in general, it is more difficult for the social optimum to be achieved only 
through an ITQ regime when fishers take into consideration the quota price effect than when 
they do not. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have examined whether or not the social optimum (the long-run efficiency) 
can be achieved only through an ITQ regime. In particular, assuming the existence of 
heterogeneous fishers in terms of cost structure, we explicitly considered vessel 
transactions/shifts between fishers. Moreover, we considered two cases in terms of real 
situations: one in which larger vessels are more efficient and one in which smaller vessels 
are more efficient.  
We found that when large-scale vessels are more efficient than small-scale vessels, 
long-run efficiency is achieved. Nevertheless, when small-scale vessels are more efficient 
than large-scale vessels, long-run efficiency is not achieved; the number of vessels becomes 
fewer than that when the total cost is minimized. Moreover, we applied the basic analysis to 
extended situations. We demonstrated that the similar results hold even when there are 
switching costs and when fishers take into consideration the effect of their own vessel 
transactions/shifts on the quota price. Depending on the types of regulations on quota 
                                                  
24 Recall from Proposition 3 that the social optimum cannot be achieved in Case B. 
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holdings, the results survive the case in which vessel owners are able to own more than one 
vessel.  
   ITQ regimes are powerful tools for achieving both effective resource management and 
the economic efficiency of fishing activities. In fact, they have been proven to be more 
effective than other adopted measures. It may, however, be true that an ITQ regime for itself 
cannot achieve the social optimum. This fact has also been demonstrated by several studies 
(see, for example, Anderson (1991), Vestergaard et al. (2005), and Bergland and Pederson 
(2006)). In such cases, an ITQ program accompanied by other auxiliary measures, such as 
the encouragement of vessel shifts, can be effective.  
   We did not factor in the market power of fishers in the quota market, which implies that 
we did not consider the effects on the short-run efficiency in detail. We also did not consider 
the farsighted fishers who predict the sequence of vessel transactions/shifts in the future. The 
investigation of the long-run efficiency incorporating these additional factors is our future 
task.  
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Appendix A 
Let us neglect the integer problem in this and the following Appendices to capture the 
essence intuitively. Using (3), total differentiation of (2)’ with respect to ),( SLini   
yields: 
     0**  LLLLL
L
qcFqc
dn
dTC ,                                       (A.1) 
     0**  SSSSS
S
qcFqc
dn
dTC .                                       (A.2) 
It is clear that each condition implies that the average cost is equal to the marginal cost for 
each type of fisher. From (1), it is impossible that (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied at the same 
time. Thus, Proposition 1 holds. 
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Appendix B 
Total differentiation of (7) and (8) with respect to  SLini ,  yields: 
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Thus, we obtain: 
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,             (A.3) 
where   0 LSSL ncnc . Note that all of them are negative. Thus, from (7) and (A.3), 
it is obtained that 
  0
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T
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Figure 1 (a). Cost Structure of Case A 
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Figure 1 (b). Cost Structure of Case B 
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      Figure 3. The profit of a large-scale fisher who is a buyer of quotas 
 in the quota market when  ALAL qACpr ,, ˆ  
 
 
